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ABSTRACT 
Recent empirical and theoretical research stresses it is important for survey respondents to 
believe that survey votes are consequential, meaning their votes can potentially influence 
whether a proposed policy is undertaken. We test the effect of a randomly assigned referendum 
tax on consequentiality, using a survey about water conservation in western North Carolina. We 
find that consequentiality is endogenous to hypothetical referendum responses. Specifically, as 
the assigned tax amount increases, respondents are less likely to find the survey consequential. 
As in related studies, respondents who self-report they perceive the survey to be consequential 
have a higher willingness to pay. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hypothetical bias occurs when there is a divergence between behavioral intentions elicited in a 
survey setting and actual behavior. Debate continues around the accuracy of the contingent 
valuation method (CVM), with hypothetical bias being one of the major issues. In 2012, the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives featured a symposium on the CVM. Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao 
(2012) provided an overview of the method and its development, concluding that when well 
designed, the CVM can provide important policy insights. Carson (2012) agreed, arguing that the 
CVM is “a practical alternative when prices aren’t available.” In stark contrast, Hausman’s 
(2012) opinion on CVM went from “dubious to hopeless” in the ability of the CVM to accurately 
measure value. One of Hausman’s (2012) issues with the CVM is “hypothetical response bias 
that leads contingent valuation to overstatements of value.” Several meta-analyses compare value 
estimates from hypothetical and real choices. List and Gallet (2001), Little and Berrens (2004), 
and Murphy et al. (2005) find that values based on hypothetical choices are about 1.35 to 3 times 
higher than those based on real choices in experimental settings. Carson, Groves, and List 
(2014), however, suggest that the hypothetical bias critique is overstated, considering the 
inconsequential experimental settings where most of the tests of hypothetical bias have been 
attempted. 
Carson and Groves (2007, 2011) argue that field survey respondents are likely to perceive the 
elicitation to be “consequential” if they believe their responses potentially influence policy and 
the policy agent cares about the subsequent survey outcomes. With consequentiality and an 
appropriately designed elicitation mechanism, it is theoretically possible for a survey elicitation 
to be incentive compatible in the sense that respondents have incentives to truthfully reveal their 
preferences. There is mounting empirical evidence from laboratory and field experiments that 
consequential questions are not prone to hypothetical bias (Landry and List 2007; Vossler and 
Evans 2009; Vossler and Poe 2011; Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau 2012; Carson, Groves, and 
List 2014).1 
Theoretical and empirical research has found a “knife-edge” result; laboratory and field 
experiment behavior, when the probability of a real outcome is nonzero, is similar to behavior 
when the probability of a real outcome is one. When the probability of a real outcome is zero in 
the hypothetical setting, hypothetical and real behaviors diverge. This suggests that hypothetical 
behavior will be similar to real behavior if there is a positive chance that the hypothetical 
behavior will have real consequences. 
While the lack of consequentiality helps explain why laboratory and field experiments exhibit 
hypothetical bias for private goods or voluntary contributions, it is not necessarily an explanation 
for hypothetical bias in referendum contingent valuation surveys. First, consequential CVM 
surveys are expected to be more accurate, but there are no predictions on the direction of bias for 
inconsequential surveys. Inconsequential stated preferences may be understated if respondents 
answer with “protest no’s” or overstated if respondents “yea say.” In two CVM applications, 
Herriges et al. (2010) and Vossler and Watson (2013) ask a follow-up question to determine if 
respondents consider the survey to be consequential. They find that respondents who believe the 
survey results are inconsequential are less likely to support the policy. 
Interis and Petrolia (2014) further explore the effects of consequentiality in binary and multiple 
discrete choice experiment questions. Interis and Petrolia (2014) do not find the knife-edge result 
with a binary discrete choice experiment but do with a multiple discrete choice experiment 
question. Willingness to pay is greatest for respondents who believe it is very likely that policy 
makers will take survey results into consideration, and lowest when respondents think that this is 
unlikely. In addition, they find that respondents who believed the survey was inconsequential 
were less sensitive to scope effects. Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau (2012) also find that 
willingness to pay is a function of the level of consequentiality perceptions. Vossler and Watson 
(2013) conduct sensitivity analysis of their results by incorporating consequentiality in the 
empirical willingness-to-pay model. A dummy variable indicating respondents who find the 
survey to be inconsequential has a negative effect on willingness to pay. Deleting respondents 
who find the survey to be inconsequential increases the theoretical validity of the willingness-to-
pay model. Both Interis and Petrolia (2014) and Vossler and Watson (2013) find evidence to 
support an important implication of Carson and Groves’s (2007) results: respondents who 
perceive the survey to be inconsequential may not care about the outcome of the survey, so they 
have little reason to invest in well thought out responses. 
In this paper we contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, we provide another 
test for the effects of perceived consequentiality on willingness to pay and differences across 
covariates under different levels of perceived consequentiality. Vossler and Watson (2013) 
consider the determinants of consequentiality. Herriges et al. (2010), Interis and Petrolia (2013), 
and Vossler and Watson (2013) consider whether consequentiality perceptions are endogenous. 
We test for the determinants of consequentiality and consider endogeneity by estimating a joint 
bivariate probit model of consequentiality and willingness to pay. 
No study to date has considered the endogeneity of the randomly assigned tax on 
consequentiality in a hypothetical referendum. This is a potentially important omission, as stated 
cost has been found to affect respondent perceptions. For instance, Groothuis and Miller (1997) 
find that the tax amount influenced people’s perception of risk, and Carson and Groves (2007) 
find that implausibly high or low amounts can reduce the scenario’s credibility. We include the 
stated cost as a determinant in the consequentiality model. We find that individuals who received 
a high stated cost perceive that the referendum is less likely to pass, rendering the referendum 
question inconsequential. In addition, we speculate that respondents might believe that policy 
makers, if costs are high, might be less supportive of the policy. This would then weaken the 
influence of the survey and/or mean that the bar is raised (e.g., overwhelming citizen support is 
needed for implementation). We also suggest that the endogeneity of consequentiality has 
implications for the measurement of willingness to pay. 
II. THEORETICAL MODEL 
The literature does not discuss a theoretical link between the randomly assigned stated cost (e.g., 
tax) that the respondent is asked to pay and the consequentiality of the survey. We suggest that 
higher tax values can lead subjects to perceive the survey to be less consequential, and our 
empirical results support this conjecture. While our goal in this paper is not to provide a formal 
proof of the conditions under which this result is expected, we provide a simple model to 
illustrate how the tax value may affect respondents’ beliefs about consequentiality. 
Carson, Groves, and List (2014), hereafter CGL, suggest “a testable implication of [Carson and 
Grove’s (2007)] framework is that the fraction of people who favor a policy action in the 
population of interest should be invariant to the probability that the survey will influence the 
decision to provide the public good under the specified terms as long as that probability is 
positive” (p. 173). A number of ballot rules can be considered for the referendum as long as the 
probability a project is pursued is increasing in the number of votes in favor of the project and 
the probability of pursuing the project given any votes in favor is greater than the probability 
when no one votes in favor. 
In addition to CGL, Cummings and Taylor (1998), Landry and List (2007), and Vossler and 
Evans (2009) have varied the probability of the vote being binding and examined the resulting 
distribution of yes votes.2 The stochastic treatments in these experimental designs can be 
modeled as a two-stage lottery where subjects first vote on whether or not to provide (and pay 
for) the good and then find out if their votes will be binding. The certainty treatments in these 
experiments are equivalent to a real, incentive compatible referendum wherein the results are 
binding as long as the appropriate plurality is met. In the stochastic treatments, subjects knew the 
probability the vote would be binding; this can be compared to an advisory referendum in which 
voters know the likelihood the good will be provided, subject to the plurality being met. 
Modeling the voting process as a two-stage lottery can provide some insights into the importance 
of the tax size on perceptions of consequentiality. The compound lottery involves (1) the 
probability the referendum passes (either with a majority or a specified plurality) and (2) the 
probability the referendum will be binding given that it passes. We call (1) P(majority), or P(m), 
and the conditional probability in (2) P(binding|majority), or P(b|m). This notation is convenient, 
but we note that “majority” can be replaced with “plurality” or even “threshold.” Moreover, if 
the referendum is advisory, “binding” can be replaced with “influential” without loss of 
generality. The model can also allow for the fact that the ballot rules are such that the likelihood 
the vote is binding is increasing in the number of those who vote in favor. 
Assuming the decision-maker has the power to coerce payment if the referendum is binding, then 
(1) and (2) form the joint probability P(m∩b)= P(m)P(b|m). In a “real” binding referendum 
P(b|m)=1, so P(m∩b)= P(m). In other words, the probability the referendum both passes and is 
binding is just the probability of a majority vote in favor. 
Let superscript R denote the real referendum and S denote the survey referendum. In the real 
referendum P(m∩b)= P(m)R. In the survey referendum P(m∩b)= P(m)SP(b|m)S. CGL suggest 
that the percentage voting in favor should be invariant to the probability of the vote being 
binding, as long as that probability is positive. Using our notation this implies that for P(b|m)S > 
0   
 
Thus, the subjective probability of the survey referendum passing equals the subjective 
probability of the real referendum passing only when the probability of the survey referendum 
being binding (if passed) is certain. That is, 
 
Alternatively, if the (subjective or real) probability of the referendum is binding is less than 1 it 
must be true that the subjective probability of a majority is higher in the survey referendum. That 
is, 
 
The somewhat counterintuitive explanation here is that the lower the conditional probability the 
survey will be binding, the higher the subjective probability it will pass relative to a real 
referendum. This is in fact what Cummings and Taylor (1998) find in their experiment. On the 
other hand, CGL find support for their hypothesis that the percentage of yes votes is statistically 
the same in the stochastically binding and deterministically binding treatments.3 
The compound lottery example also illustrates the link between the stated cost or tax and the 
respondents’ beliefs about the consequentiality of the survey. For example, a well-behaved 
willingness-to-pay function will be declining in the size of the stated cost. Hence, the probability 
of a yes vote decreases as the stated cost increases. As the probability of yes votes decreases, the 
subjective probability of a vote threshold being met must also decrease. Therefore, the 
probability of influencing policy decreases, and the probability of believing the referendum is 
consequential could also decrease. This is suggestive of an inverse relationship between the 
value of the stated cost and beliefs about the consequentiality of the referendum. This effect is a 
direct result of the impact of the stated cost’s magnitude on voters’ probability of voting in favor 
of the good or policy. 
In our study, although we randomly vary the stated cost across respondents, there is no language 
in the survey that indicates that costs differ across households. Even in situations where such a 
belief over uniform payment may not hold (e.g., see Vossler and Watson 2013), our results 
should still follow. Vossler and Watson (2013) set the payment vehicle as a property tax increase 
that would be levied on the respondent’s taxable home value. One could interpret changes in the 
tax rate (1% vs. 1.5%, etc.) as equivalent to changes in the stated cost. A separate question is 
how knowledge of or beliefs about potentially differentiated payments affect the probability of a 
yes vote and hence the consequentiality of the survey. That question is outside the scope of this 
paper and a topic for future research. 
III. WATER CONSERVATION SURVEY 
We use data from a survey on water conservation measures in the mountains of western North 
Carolina. The survey of 51 questions, including demographics, was mailed in May 2013 to a 
random sample of 3,000 Watauga and Ashe County residents. It consisted of a primary mailing, 
a post card reminder, and a second mailing to all nonrespondents of the first mailing. In the end, 
2,413 useable addresses and 591 responses were obtained, for a useable response rate of 25%. 
Table 1 contains a summary of the demographic variables. The average age of respondents was 
61 years and average income was $56,000. In the two counties of our sample, 24% of 
respondents have a high school degree or less, 18% have some college but no degree, 10% have 
an associate’s degree, 24% have a bachelor’s degree, and 24% have a graduate or professional 
degree. Comparing our sample to U.S. Census data from the counties, we find that about 23% of 
Watauga County residents (over age 20) and 35% of Ashe County residents (over age 20) are 60 
or older; 38% of Watauga County and 19% of Ashe County residents have a college degree; 
average household income in Watauga County is about $52,000 and is about $47,000 in Ashe 
County. Therefore, our survey respondents tend to be older, slightly more educated, and have 
higher income than the general population in this area. In addition, we find that 50% report 
having ancestors who lived in this region. Regarding water source, 52% report having their own 
well, 12% their own spring, and 19% a shared well, and 17% are on a municipal water supply. 
The willingness-to-pay question for water conservation measures is a single binary choice 
framework (Carson and Louviere 2011). The variable for is a qualitative variable equal to one if 
the respondents answered for to the following referendum question: 
Suppose that to implement water conservation measures county residents would pay a one-time 
payment of $A per household in higher county taxes. The money would be used to provide 
rebates to residents for the purchase of low-flow toilets or rain barrels to help save water at 
home. The money would also be used to revegetate creek banks and install permeable pavement 
where feasible. These measures reduce runoff from storms and help with recharging the ground-
water supply. The goal of the program is to provide more water security in the county and to 
ensure a more stable water supply that can ease stress during droughts. Suppose that this 
proposal to approve the tax and provide conservation measures will be on the next election 
ballot. Remember, if the proposal passes you would make a one-time payment of $A in higher 
taxes and you would have $A less to spend on other things. Also remember that if the 
referendum passes the conservation measures would be implemented and more water would be 
available in your county during times of drought. 
 
  
  
Table 1.  
Data Summary 
Note: Sample size = 591. 
The tax amount variable $A took on the values of $5, $20, $40, $80, or $150.4 We asked 
respondents how they would vote on this proposal with three alternatives: for, against, or don’t 
know. We find that the frequency of respondents who would vote for falls from 60% at $5 to 
30% at $150. About 18% of respondents answered don’t know over all values of $A. One 
problem that arises when coding single binary choice CVM questions is what should be done 
with don’t know responses. We code all don’t know responses as voting against the policy. This 
is supported empirically by Carson, Hanemann, et al. (1998), Groothuis and Whitehead (2002), 
and Caudill and Groothuis (2005).5 
To test for the influence of consequentiality we use a follow up question to our contingent 
valuation question that is similar to that of Vossler and Watson (2013): “To what extent do you 
believe that the indicated votes on the above proposal from you and other survey participants 
will be taken in to consideration by county policy makers?” Possible responses ranged from 1 to 
5, where respondents who stated 1 believe policy makers will definitely not take the information 
into account and 5 means respondents believe policy makers will definitely take the information 
into account. 
In Table 2, we report the percentage of respondents who indicated they would vote for the 
proposal by both the bid level and the degree of consequentiality. The first column contains 
responses for those who think the referendum is inconsequential, and the degree of 
consequentiality increases to the right. We test for equal frequencies of for votes across the tax 
amounts and find that for C = 1 and C = 2, as the bid increases the percentages of for votes are 
not statistically different. As the bid increases the percentage of for votes falls when C =3, C = 4, 
and C = 5 at the 95% level of confidence. Considering the total votes, the percentage of for votes 
increases with perceived consequentiality until the final option. Of the individuals who answered 
1 to the consequentiality question, only 17% voted for in the referendum. Of those who answered 
2 on the consequentiality statement, we find 43% answered for, and of those who answered 3, we 
find 46% voted for. The proportion of for votes rises to 73% for respondents who answered for 
to the consequentiality question, and falls back to 46% for votes among respondents who 
selected 5 (“definitely taken into account”) to the consequentiality question. 
 
  
  
Table 2.  
Distribution of For Responses by Tax Amount and Consequentiality Level 
Note: Sample sizes in parentheses. The null hypothesis for the chi-squared test is the percent 
voting for does not vary by bid amount. 
* Significant at the 95% level. 
Mechanism theory suggests that a survey referendum can be incentive compatible under certain 
assumptions, including consequentiality (Carson and Groves 2007; Vossler, Doyon, and 
Rondeau 2012). The theory of consequentiality suggests that respondents who believe the 
incentive-compatible CVM question might influence policy will answer the questions as if they 
face real payments. Following the law of demand, the most basic empirical evidence that a 
referendum question is incentive compatible is that the probability of voting for the policy 
decreases as the tax amount increases. Using a chi-squared test, we find that for individuals who 
answered either 1 or 2 to the consequentiality question, the tax variable does not affect the 
proportion of for responses, suggesting these individuals do not find the CVM question incentive 
compatible. Past research suggests that a knife-edge result occurs when a survey is considered at 
least somewhat consequential relative to when the survey is completely inconsequential 
(Herriges et al. 2010; Vossler and Watson 2013). We find that a structural shift in elicited 
preferences occurs as the consequentiality question response goes from 2 to 3. Our interpretation 
differs from the interpretation of some of the past research in that we also consider incentive 
compatibility, and using this criterion we find the threshold for valid CVM responses is at a 
greater level of perceived consequentiality than that implied by the knife-edge result. 
IV. WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND 
CONSEQUENTIALITY 
To test the influence of consequentiality on willingness to pay, we provide several probit model 
specifications: 
 
where for is equal to 1 if a respondent said he would vote in favor of the referendum, tax is the 
randomly assigned tax amount, α0 is a constant, α1 is the coefficient on the log of the tax 
variable, and X is a vector of explanatory variables with corresponding coefficient vector δ. In 
the first column of Table 3 we report the results of the basic model, which includes no control for 
consequentiality. In this specification, we find that gender, education, and the respondent’s water 
source all influence the probability of voting for the water conservation policy. We also find that 
a respondent having had an ancestor in the region lowered the likelihood of voting for the water 
conservation policy. This is consistent with the results of Cockerill and Groothuis (2014). The 
coefficient on the tax amount is negative and significant. We estimate the median willingness to 
pay for conservation measures using the censored probit approach6 and find that the median is 
$11.96 (standard error = 3.26).7 
 
  
  
Table 3.  
Probit Determinants of Referendum Votes (For = 1) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level. 
In the second column, we control for consequentiality using a dummy variable, as do Vossler 
and Watson (2013). Following the results from Table 2, where we test for response validity at 
each level of consequentiality, if a respondent answered 3, 4, or 5 to the consequentiality 
question it was coded as one (C>2 = 1) and if she answered 1 or 2 it was coded zero (C≤2 = 0). 
We find that the sign and significance of all explanatory variables stay the same with a slight 
decrease in the magnitude on the ancestor coefficient, while the coefficient on the 
consequentiality dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that when 
respondents find the CVM question consequential, they are more likely to vote for the policy. 
When respondents find the survey consequential, the median WTP estimate is $22.80 (standard 
error = 6.60). When respondents find the survey inconsequential, the willingness-to-pay estimate 
is $3.60 (standard error = 1.96). 
To further test the influence of consequentiality, we split the sample into two groups based on 
the consequentiality dummy variable. In Table 3, column 3 we report the sub-sample of 
respondents who find the CVM question consequential and exhibit valid responses. We find that 
the coefficient on the tax amount is negative and statistically significant, and the magnitude of 
the coefficient increased relative to the basic model. This suggests that the tax amount has more 
influence on the likelihood of voting for the conservation measures. The willingness-to-pay 
estimate increases to $27.20 (standard error = 5.98). In the last column of Table 3 we report the 
results for the respondents who found the survey relatively inconsequential and find that the 
coefficient on the log of the tax amount is not statistically significant, as in Table 2. Overall, we 
consider these models as insightful but naïve because they do not treat the perceived 
consequentiality of the question as endogenous as theory suggests. The coefficient on the 
consequentiality dummy variable may be biased. 
To correct for the potential for endogeneity bias, we estimate bivariate probit models on the 
likelihood of voting for the water conservation measure and the likelihood of respondents finding 
the survey consequential. We include the consequentiality dummy variable in the voting 
equation and an instrumental variable to identify the bivariate probit (Wilde 2000). Our 
instrument is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement: “Local public officials (city/county) should have the final authority to make decisions 
about how our water supply is managed.”8 The negative coefficient on the instrument variable in 
the consequentiality model shows that respondents who believe that decisions should be made at 
the local level do not believe that the survey is consequential. One possible explanation for this 
result is that although respondents feel decisions should be made at the local level, they are not 
confident that decisions actually are or will be made at that level, making the survey 
inconsequential. Another potential explanation is that in situations where there is high trust in 
public officials, there is less perceived need to engage in policy or decision-making processes 
(Sabatier et al. 2005). If respondents prefer local control because they trust local officials, 
perhaps this extends to trusting those officials to take appropriate action regardless of the survey 
results. The instrumental variable is not a statistically significant determinant of the referendum 
votes. 
To test for the influence of consequentiality, we estimate two bivariate probit models: the first 
does not include the log of the tax amount variable in the consequentiality equation, while the 
second does. The bivariate probit model provides a unique way to test for the impact of 
consequentiality on referendum votes. First, the coefficient on the tax amount captures the 
influence of the tax on the perception that the survey results will have an impact on policy. Our 
theory suggests that as the tax amount rises, the perceived level of consequentiality should fall 
(because the subjective probability of the referendum passing declines). Second, the coefficient 
on the consequentiality dummy variable in the referendum vote equation will capture the direct 
effect of the perception of consequentiality on the likelihood of voting for the referendum. Third, 
the rho (ρ) coefficient measures the correlation between error terms of the two equations. 
Table 4 shows in both bivariate probits the coefficient on the consequential dummy variable is 
positive and significantt, suggesting that the observed effect of a survey being consequential 
increases the likelihood of a for vote.9 The coefficient on the consequentiality dummy variable is 
three times greater than the coefficient in the similar model in Table 3.10 The rho coefficient is 
negative and significant in both specifications. This result suggests that there are some 
unobservable characteristics that decrease the likelihood of voting for the water conservation 
policy and increase the perception that the survey is consequential. 
 
 
Table 4.  
Bivariate Probit Determinants of Consequentiality and Referendum Votes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level. 
To test for the influence of the tax payment on consequentiality in the second model, we include 
the log of the tax amount in the consequentiality specification. Consistent with our theoretical 
predictions and Table 2, we find that high tax amounts increase the probability of 
inconsequential survey results. The other variables that determine the level of consequentiality 
are if a respondent had an ancestor in the county, had attended some college, or shared a well. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Consequentiality exists when the respondent believes that the results of the survey will influence 
the policy and when respondents perceive that they will be affected by the payment vehicle. Our 
analysis finds that consequentiality is endogenous to the hypothetical referendum question. 
Using a survey about water conservation measures, we find that as the tax amount increases, 
respondents are less likely to believe that the survey is consequential. Respondents might believe 
governments are less likely to implement policies with higher taxes. Survey researchers thus 
need to take care when framing the referendum because high tax payments may lower the 
credibility of the survey, making individuals less likely to find the survey consequential. In 
addition, as in previous research, we find that respondents who self-report that they perceive the 
survey to be consequential are more likely to be willing to pay positive amounts for the policy. 
These results are important for improving stated preference research. Our work provides 
guidance for including consequentiality questions in any CVM study. Future studies that assess 
the effects of consequentiality should consider its determinants and whether including it as a 
determinant of willingness to pay is appropriate. Alternative wording of perceived 
consequentiality questions should also be explored, as well as differentiating between policy 
consequentiality and payment consequentiality. Our results also have implications for bid design 
in referendum surveys, as the tax amount was found to influence consequentiality. CVM 
researchers should work to find the balance between high tax amounts that better identify the 
willingness-to-pay distribution and those that negatively impact consequentiality. Follow-up 
debriefing questions could help identify these problem areas. 
These results are also important for improving policy making. Specific to water conservation, 
our work can contribute to improved policy making, as it provides a higher level of confidence in 
public survey results about conservation management. As human populations continue to grow 
and climate change drives increased pressure on water resources, better understanding of public 
perceptions about water issues and management preferences will be valuable. This may be 
especially true in humid areas that have historically not faced water concerns and hence have not 
had explicit public discussion or debate about water management options. The CVM can be used 
to help water managers identify options that are most palatable to their constituents and thereby 
reduce conflict as they make potentially controversial decisions. 
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Footnotes 
1. Consequentiality may also improve results when the hypothetical question is not incentive 
compatible. Bulte et al. (2005), using an implicit donation payment vehicle, find that a 
hypothetical question with a consequential script generates lower willingness-to-pay estimates 
than the hypothetical question without a consequential script. 
2. Cummings and Taylor’s probability values are p = {0,0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. CGL use p = {0, 0.2, 
0.5, 0.8, 1}. Landry and List (2007) also have a consequentiality treatment in which p = {0, 0.5, 
1}. Their results are similar to CGL’s, and the good being valued (sports memorabilia) is similar. 
3. CGL note in footnote 25 that the alternative hypothesis using a one-tail test is that the 
probabilistic treatments would have more yes votes. That is what this two-stage lottery model 
predicts and is what Cummings and Taylor (1998) find. 
4. A pretest survey was developed in 2012 and administered in the Town of Boone, the largest 
town in the broader study area, and this generated 129 responses that were used to revise several 
of the survey questions and survey structure. Additionally, a group of 12 students at Appalachian 
State University served as a focus group that took the survey and provided feedback. 
5. We find that the results do not change when we exclude don’t know responses from the data. 
6. The censored probit approach involves dividing the sum of the coefficients evaluated at the 
means of the independent variables by the coefficient on the tax amount (Cameron and James 
1987; Haab and McConnell 2002). Willingness to pay is the exponential of this sum when the 
natural log of the tax is used. 
7. Mean willingness-to-pay estimates are very similar to the medians in the rest of this section. 
The median willingness-to-pay estimates are more straightforward to estimate with the log-linear 
functional form, so we present them in the paper. 
8. We find that this dummy variable coefficient is statistically significantly in the 
consequentiality probit but insignificant in the willingness-to-pay probit. 
9. We find that the results do not change in sign depending upon how we group consequentiality 
levels but are insignificant when including only individuals who answered 1 as inconsequential. 
In our analysis we use the cutoff at 2 because the results at C = 2 are not theoretically valid, as 
shown in Table 2 (although, given the overall level of votes, 46% for, the willingness to pay is 
likely about the same). 
10. The willingness-to-pay estimate with the consequentiality dummy variable set equal to 1 is 
unrealistically high and statistically insignificant in this model. Our advice would be to use the 
willingness-to-pay estimate from the split sample model in Table 3 for policy analysis. 
 
 
 
